Yanis Varoufakis interviewed by de Volksrant
-Let’s go back to your brief period in office first. What were the happiest moments during that time?
“When I would take the lift down to leave the Ministry of Finance, to walk to Parliament or to the Prime Minister’s office, away from the oppressive meeting rooms, enjoying walking on the street amongst normal people. They were a great source of encouragement.”
-No pleasant memories with your counterparts in the Eurogroup at all?
“Anyone who speaks about blissful moments in the Eurogroup should be locked up immediately for being a dangerous lunatic (Laughs). The Eurogroup is a very unpleasant place, including for Schäuble, Dijsselbloem and the ECB president Draghi. Centres of power are stressful by definition, with big egos and continuous conflict. If you’re a psychopath and you thrive on conflict, then the Eurogroup is the place to be.”
-Or if you’re interested in power.
“Ultimately, almost no one has any power. The institutions have the power, not the individuals. The individuals’ power is undermined by opposing powers, everyone’s power being cancelled out by everyone else’s. I’ve seen a lot of frustration in the Eurogroup.”
-What do you regret about the five months being a minister?
“That I trusted in the unity of the Greek government, or to be more precise: the unity within the war cabinet of seven people, including Prime Minister Tsipras and me. We were together day and night during that time. I slept the way you sleep in the trenches in a real war: a few hours here and there, with all your senses on edge. I trusted blindly in Tsipras, wrongly.”
-Do you feel betrayed?
“We from ‘the left’ have a terrible record of accusing each other of betrayal, condemning each other with increasingly toxic language. I don’t want to do that. But do I feel disappointed? Yes, hugely. Tsipras surrendered to the demands of the Eurogroup – without consulting me.”
-Do you still have contact with your European colleagues from back then?
“Certainly, with a few. But I won’t say who, that would damage them.”
-Is it that dangerous to stay in contact with you?
“I symbolise the resistance against the third bailout of 86 billion euros for Greece. A plan that none of my colleagues wanted, but which they approved unanimously nevertheless. Many are in a terrible psychological, and political, situation and I don’t want to make it worse.”
-Do you remember why you got into politics?
“Absolutely, for the same reason that I’m travelling around to spread the same ideas now. Political office was never on my radar, it was not an ambition. But after the implosion of the Greek state in 2010, in fact the bankruptcy, I started campaigning with articles, a book and lectures, just like I am now. I said that borrowing even more under strict terms that squeeze the incomes from which old and new loans would need to be repaid would squeeze the economy to ruins. That would be catastrophic for our people and unfair to our creditors. My standpoint was to accept the bankruptcy and put our house in order. When Tsipras started to take my advice, on the appropriateness of this approach,, I knew the day might come when he would ask me to put these theories and analyses into practice. At that point it ceases to be a request. It becomes an obligation, a tour of duty.”
-That sounds very negative, like a chore.
“There’s nothing wrong with chores. It is Kant’s categorical imperative: there are some things that you have to do. Animals have inclinations, we humans have duties. I never wanted to become the faculty head at the university, and found that everyone who did have that ambition should not be a professor. A good professor wants to teach and write, not manage a department. Professors should take on administrative duties in turn, , as a chore. That’s also how I think about political office..”
-What does politics give and what does it take?
“It takes your privacy and inner peace. It gives one headaches, big headaches. If I’d said ‘no’ to Tsipras, my life would have certainly been much easier, and I wouldn’t be sitting here with you in Geneva. But I would never have forgiven myself if I hadn’t tried. The wish not to have regrets later is what motivates me. I thought that I could make a difference, a big difference, not just some meaningless difference. I thought that I could help restructure the Greek debt, could set up an investment bank, and a ‘bad bank’ to manage the banks’ bad loans. That’s what I went in it for. To succeed in these tasks. It didn’t pan out that way.”
-Who is the boss in the Eurogroup?
“Wolfgang Schäuble. He’s the puppet master who pulls all the strings. All the other ministers are marionettes. The president of the Eurogroup has no real power. Dijsselbloem has no authority; he is a soldier, a puppet.”
-What do you mean no authority?
“He can’t make any decisions without calling Schäuble.”
-Not the French minister Sapin?
(Laughing) “Sapin? Oh, no! Schäuble is the grandmaster of the Eurogroup. He decides who becomes the president, he determines the agenda, he controls everything.”
-And who leads intellectually?
“Schäuble of course.”
-Not the president?
“No comment.”
-In El Paìs, you called Dijsselbloem an ‘intellectual lightweight’. Why?
“Because it’s true.
– Why?
– I don’t know. Some combination of nature and nurture, I suppose. But that goes too far for this interview.”
-Who did you listen to in the Eurogroup?
“To Mario Draghi, a formidable economist. Draghi is very frustrated by the suffocating limitations of his ECB mandate. And I went to Schäuble for advice; he is cunning and has vision and authority. When I spoke with him, I didn’t keep any cards up my sleeve, and he didn’t either. Of course I didn’t go to Dijsselbloem: that would have been a waste of time. Dijsselbloem is a cog in a machine that he doesn’t understand himself. There was absolutely no reason for me to speak with Jeroen because he was neither willing nor able to have a real discussion, let alone interested.”
-And Moscovici, the European Commissioner for Economic and Financial Affairs?
“Moscovici? Ah, we were actually always in agreement, but he couldn’t deliver.”
-Is that practical, stepping on everyone’s toes? You accused the ECB and the bailout fund, your creditors, of monetary terrorism; Italy would collapse if it didn’t help Greece…
“But it’s true! Closing down our banks was an attempt to terrorise the Greeks into submission. There was no economic reason for it. As for Italy, I never said anything of the sort. The Italian press took something I had said in December 2010 (that Greece’s problems in 2010 would, within 2011, spread to Italy, threatening its government with insolvency – something that was quite correct) and presented it as something I had said in… 2015. Don’t forget that I was confronted with an extremely venomous press in Italy. It seemed like chemical warfare.”
-But you needed something from your colleagues. Normally you don’t make enemies, you look for allies.
“That’s what I did.”
-Without success: it was 18 to 1 in the Eurogroup.
“Not for my lack of trying. I visited Sapin in Paris. During the press conference, my speech was as diplomatic as you could imagine. In his office, behind closed doors, it was all hugs and cuddles, nothing but brotherly love. That Sapin distanced himself from me in the press conference that followed had to do with his agenda, the budget deficit in France, not with me or Greece. I went to my Italian counterpart Padoan, to Schäuble, to Draghi with the same message every time: I represent the most reform-oriented government ever in Greece..”
-On 24 April, three months after you took office, you were sharply criticised by your colleagues during a Eurogroup meeting in Riga. They chewed you up and spat you out. After that, your influence quickly went downhill.
“Nothing of the sort at the personal level. I was never attacked or even criticised personally. But, you are right, Riga was absolutely a turning point – when the Eurogroup’s attitude towards my government turned nasty. But above all it was orchestrated, almost a conspiracy, a plot. The evening before, there was a secret meeting of around ten of the most important people in the Eurogroup. I happened to run into them around 11:00 p.m. in the hotel lobby when I was looking for a colleague to have a drink. An frightening silence fell when I entered and said hello.”
-You didn’t ask if you could join them for a drink?
“I think I did, but there was so much consternation that I just left. The next morning, I walked into the meeting room: key players were missing. When Greece came up for discussion, the door suddenly burst open and they entered in unison. It was so orchestrated. Then the tirade against our govenrment’s positions began. But, remember, none of this was aimed at me, not personally at least.”
-Did you record that meeting?
“Of course, apart from the first one I recorded all the Eurogroup meetings! But let me remind you, no one had heard these recordings except for me. I recorded them for my own records. Among my colleagues who leaked all kinds of falsities – especially about me – I was the only one who respected confidentiality out of a sense of ethics. I recorded everything for one simple reason: those meetings often lasted so terribly long that, afterwards, I could barely remember what exactly had been said. After the first Eurogroup, my memories of the proceedings were hazy and, in that state, I had to inform my Prime Minister, cabinet and Parliament on exchanges that were crucial to our nation. Then I thought I should tape everything. In a properly functioning institution, there proper minutes would have taken for the use of participants. Then I would not need my own recordings to fall back on.”
-Back to the Riga turning point. After the end, Dijsselbloem and others called Tsipras: we have to talk about Yanis. He is a problem.
“They said to Tsipras: if you want a deal, you have to get rid of Yanis. What they really meant was: Stop your opposition to austerity, accept new loans, all the terms, and above all a high budget primary surplus. I was, personally, associated with opposition to this basic ‘logic’ that was the foundation of the previous Eurogroup programmes. The primary surplus they demanded would keep the Greek wound festering. Not one economist disputed that I was right. They knew that I would never accept such a package. That’s why the Eurogroup was looking for a political way to eliminate me: it was a conspiracy. In Riga, a strategy of pushing a wedge between Tsipras and me had begun.”
-Shortly after that Tsipras manoeuvred you to the sideline in the negotiations with the troika, the representatives of the ECB, the Commission and the IMF responsible for the implementation of the bailout package.
“I lost control of the technical discussions in Brussels and Tsipras did concede to the troika for the large primary surplus I was opposing. When I asked him about it he said: you have to give something to get something. I said: OK, what are you getting back? He answered: debt relief. I shouted: that’s not what you got; this is the stupidest thing anyone could have done! If you commit to a high primary surplus it is like accepting that your debt can be serviced. Why would they then give you debt relief? A few days later, I wrote my first resignation letter, which I kept to myself. I was sure that, once we had given them the high primary surplus, whatever other concessions we made would not be enough. The troika wanted to drag the Greek government through the mud to humiliate us completely with a bank closure and a complete surrender. But even though I saw that coming, I didn’t send my resignation letter. I didn’t want to let my government down during the fight.
I didn’t even think Riga was that bad, hard criticism is part of the game – especially given that it was not directed at me personally. What was painful was that Tsipras submitted to the Eurogroup’s demands behind my back. The unity in the war cabinet was broken, the others began to capitulate. From that moment, my being a minister was no longer a chore. Torture is too strong a word, but it did become painful, very painful.”
-In January you were the new kid on the block, a media star. Dijsselbloem came to meet you in Athens directly, something that other newcomers…
“He wanted to pander to Schäuble. Score points with Wolfgang, make an impression. But he didn’t make any impression at all, certainly not on Schäuble.”
-My question is: you had a unique chance. To paraphrase Michael Horn, the head of VW in America: you totally screwed up. What went wrong?
“My biggest mistake – and only big mistake – was during a Eurogroup teleconference at the end of February to seal the 20th February Eurogroup agreement and extend the pre-existing loan agreement by four months so as to gain time to negotiate a new reform agenda. In the teleconference, the three representatives of the troika backtracked from the 20th February agreement, insisting that the previous reform agenda (the Memorandum of Understanding – MoU) would remain current. So, what was the purpose of a new reform agenda? It was clear they were backtracking badly. That’s when I should have blown the whole thing out of the water. That would have kept the Greek government unified. But at that moment I was sitting alone in my office, on a telephone link with the rest of the Eurogroup, having to decide to pull the trigger. I did not pull it thinking that the demand to return to the MoU was only verbal and that we were covered by the written text of the 20th February Eurogroup agreement, which made no mention of the MoU and explicitly referred to a new list of reforms to be submitted by the Greek government. However, in the next few days, it became clear to me that the troika would never let go. Their coup d’état was already planned before we took power. There wasn’t anything radical about what I proposed – just moderate measures for letting Greece recover – but an accord with us would have been politically disastrous for the troika and the Eurogroup because it would show that resistance against the troika pays off. That glimmer of hope for the citizens was not permitted because there were elections in Spain, Portugal and Ireland, countries that had drained the cup of austerity to the bottom. An accord with us would make the Spanish premier Rajoy and his Irish colleague Kenny look foolish: ‘you see, you could have achieved something better’, their electorate would say to them. The Eurogroup’s strategy was to let us bleed, to keep putting us through the wringer by forcing us to be in the permanent dilemma: do we pay the IMF or our pensioners?”
-The Eurogroup only had one request: deliver something now! And no trial programmes like using tourists and students as tax inspectors.
“What’s wrong with using casual labour, including tourists, to catch VAT cheats?”
-You can’t borrow billions that way.
(Irritated) “Are you only interested in what they say, or in the truth?”
-What intrigues me is the totally different experience of the reality. You and the Eurogroup were worlds apart. No wonder an accord was never reached. You say: give me time, I can’t walk on water. The Eurogroup says: you’re not doing anything.
“That is pure propaganda! Of the most toxic kind. There was a government in Athens that fought against bankruptcy from day one, and got a hard NO to every proposal it made to prevent that outcome. The troika was adamant: any action on our part, prior to a comprehensive agreement that the troika was blocking, would be considered, by the troika, casus belli. And then they blamed us of doing.. nothing.That is all, there is nothing else.”
-And the Eurogroup says the opposite.
“Do you really want to go into a they-said you-said? The truth is that the troika failed completely for five years before we were elected. There has never been an aid programme from the IMF in which a country lost 30 percent of its income during that programme. Never! It was a total fiasco.”
-Because the measures were never implemented, according to the troika.
“Countless measures were implemented. The Greek state underwent the largest austerity in history. Its failure made Greece un-reformable. Listen! During one of my first conversations with Schäuble, I told him: my biggest problem is the Greek tax authority. I don’t control it, I don’t trust the agency, I want to replace it. Not with one that is in the hands of politicians again, but an independent organisation. Can you help me? I told him, and I was hanged in the Greek press when that was leaked: I want a German to lead the new agency. Someone that you appoint.”
-And what was his answer?
“I’m not going to negotiate with you. Go to the troika: that was his answer. The Eurogroup was completely uninterested in reforms. I had excellent help with my plans from the Americans like Jeffrey Sachs and Larry Summers, who are not especially left-wing Syriza adherents! But Schäuble, Draghi, Lagarde… they had absolutely no interest in our proposals. I go to bed at night with a clear conscious and a light heart. My team was the only one that wanted real reform.”
-According to the Eurogroup, you only had one strategy: don’t move, wait until Greece is at the edge of abyss, and then the eurozone countries will still come with the billions.
(Angry) “That’s complete nonsense! The Eurogroup stalled the process so that our state would run out of money to pay billions to the IMF, while also fuelling a bank run. They were waiting for our government would collapse. That was their objective! To accuse me of being obstructive, when this was their game plan, is ridiculous! That’s how propaganda works: take the truth and inverse it. Goebbels wrote the manual for that.”
-In Brussels they still wonder: was Varoufakis an evil genius or a complete amateur? As time goes by, they tend toward the latter.
“Let them say that to my face. If I release the recordings of the Eurogroup meetings – and I will do it at some pount, at least my part – you’ll hear that everything I said was middle of the road: moderate plans, sensible economic arguments. The rest is lies.”
-How is it possible that 18 ministers with above-average intelligence misunderstand you so badly?
“You’d have to ask them.”
-You say you only made one mistake, all the misery is the others’ fault.
“One large mistake and many others. There is no doubt that the misery was not the result of my mistakes but of a coup against our government.”
-It is hard to believe you can lay all the blame outside yourself. Isn’t it time you took part of the responsibility?
“No! I won’t do that. It was nothing but a coup, one big coup d’état. And it succeeded. I’m not taking any responsibility for that. The same thing happened in 1967, when tanks brought an end to democracy in Greece. Were the democrats responsible for that? Were the citizens of Prague responsible for the Russian tanks in 1968? I reject that completely! My speeches were moderate, my plans measured, my advisors were not left-wing lunatics. There was another reason that the other side poured poison and lies over me, and portrayed me as a dangerous radical while I was the most right wing minister in the cabinet. If I was a crazy left-wing lunatic, they wouldn’t have been afraid of me. No, they wanted to get rid of me because I knew what I was talking about. Because I was working with people like Sachs and Summers. Compare their assessment of my plans with those of the Slovakian and Slovenian ministers. Put their CVs side by side and then judge who has more authority to pass judgement.”
-It is a very serious accusation: a coup d’état by the Eurogroup.
“That is true, but that’s what it was: a coup. The Eurogroup would never tolerate a government that was elected to challenge its ‘programme’.”
-Tsipras also dropped you.
“Ultimately he gave in.”
-He dropped you: he said about you that a good academic doesn’t necessarily make a good politician.
“That is a great compliment. When I entered the election I promised my voters never to turn into a ‘good politician’. By the way, Tsipras didn’t fire me, I resigned because I had not accepted the finance ministry to sign a new 86 billion euro loan that we can never pay off. With impossible conditions. Not even God could implement this programme successfully! Nevertheless, Tsipras decided to press on, although he also said that this ‘deal’ was imposed on him by a coup d’état. Tsipras is now in the midst of a tragedy in the classic sense of the word: he’s an actor in an impossible situation hoping for a deus ex machina. Oedipus also accepted his role, but it’s still tragic.”
-When you took office, the third bailout package for Greece was estimated at 30 billion euros, when you left 86 billion was needed. You are the 50 billion euro man.
“It wasn’t Varoufakis that cost 50 billion, it was the Eurogroup shooting down his plans.”
-What is your political legacy?
“That question is too lofty for me. I’m no Winston Churchill or François Mitterrand. My small legacy is the return of the politics of principle in Europe. I stood for something, was elected for that, couldn’t put it into effect, and left. This new politics, not twisting yourself up to stay in power, is something that Europe badly needs.”
-In January, you were catapulted into international politics from nothing and then shot out again just as hard. What does that do to your ego?
“It made me more detached, more stoic: just ask my wife. I don’t react to all attacks anymore. After all, it never ends. They lie through their teeth.”
-Do you have a Christmas wish for Dijsselbloem?
“Let me keep it polite and civil: I wish Jeroen all the best for 2016.”
(*) This text is an version, edited by me, of the English translation of the Dutch article that Peer Peeperkorn submitted to me. The edits I effected restored crucial parts of the conversation (that had been left out) plus some edits necessary to give the spoken word its context and meaning.
— source yanisvaroufakis.eu