Russia’s decision to invade Ukraine has been devastating for the country, the people, and the economy. But even if we assume that this massive decision was made by an extremely narrow and opaque circle, this in itself is the single most important diagnosis of the condition of the state, national institutions, and society. Of course, Russia today is an authoritarian country where citizens have very little leverage over the state. But why did the national elites — those who managed to concentrate wealth and power in their own hands, and should be more interested in preserving the status quo, and therefore play a stabilizing role — fail to develop mechanisms to restrict the possibility of such odious and destructive decisions?
The history of post-Soviet elites and their relationship with the state is divided into several stages. In the second half of the 1990s, a system of competitive oligarchy took shape in Russia — something quite common among developing countries, countries in transition, and post-Soviet states. Against the backdrop of the weakness of mass parties, the law enforcement system, and the state as a whole, oligarchic groups were quick to accumulate property and capital, and buy up media, politicians, and bureaucrats, thereby capturing the state. At the same time, the existence of several oligarchic “pyramids” ensured a relative pluralism in political life. This did not,
— source meduza.io | Kirill Rogov (Translation by Eilish Hart) | May 31, 2022